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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GREAT SALT LAKE MINERALS & 
CHEMICALS CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff'Appellant, 
vs. 
ARTHUR G. McKEE & COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff-appellant, Great 
Salt Lake Minerals and Chemicals Corporation ("GSL") 
against the defendant-respondent, Arthur G. McKee & 
Company ("McKee"), for damages in the amount of 
$300,000.00 on the grounds that the defendant was negli-
gent or breached a contractual obligation to the plaintiff 
in that it failed "to take appropriate action upon the 
failure of Houben [a vendor] to supply a performance 
I Case No. 
I 13858 
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bond, including failure to give timely notice that the bond 
had not been obtained" (R. 4). Houben by a purchase 
order was to design, fabricate and field erect a conveyer 
system for process plants that GSL was constructing. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court without a jury. The 
court made findings and facts, conclusions of law and 
entered judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing 
the plaintiff's action on the merits with prejudice (R. 96). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-respondent, McKee, seeks an affir-
mation of the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and judgment entered in its favor. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 9, 1969, the defendant, McKee, executed 
a letter of intent with the plaintiff, GSL, under which 
McKee was to perform certain engineering and procure-
ment services relative to the construction by GSL of a 
plant to extract minerals from the brines of the Great 
Salt Lake (Ex. 4-P). Although the letter of intent con-
templated the execution of a formal engineering contract 
between the parties, this contract was never executed (Tr. 
27,139). 
The letter of intent provided for close cooperation 
of the parties and contemplated that there would be close 
consultation on every material decision. These arrange-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3 
ments were in fact implemented and key personnel of 
GSL were in fact stationed in MeKee's offices in San 
Fimtcisco from late March, 1969, until early December, 
1969. These GSL personnel included Wolfgang Brink-
raann, Project Manager; Fay Demcott, Purchasing 
Agent; and others (Tr. 44, 45). 
As the project progressed, GSL assumed a greater 
and greater paiticipation in the work originally assigned 
to McKee. Portions of the engineering and design work 
were taken from McKee and assumed by GSL or given 
to other companies (Tr. 139, 141). 
On August 20,1969, Fay Demcott, GSL's Purchasing 
Agent, as an economy measure by GSL and at the request 
of GSL, was assigned the responsibility of performing the 
expediting functions on the project (Exs. 23-D, 19-D, Tr. 
38, 54-56). An expediter is a person who follows up and 
makes sure that all of the documents and requirements 
of a purchase order, including performance bonds, are 
supplied by a vendor or subcontractor (Tr. 29, 116-17, 
174). 
On August 21,1969, McKee, as agent for GSL, issued 
a letter of intent to Houben Industries, Inc. ("Houben") 
for the complete design, supply of materials, fabrication 
and field erection of a conveyor system for the GSL plant 
(Ex. 9-P). Houben proceeded immediately with the en-
gineering and design of the conveyor system (Tr. 215-16). 
On September 18, 1969, McKee, as agent for GSL, 
issued a purchase order to Houben covering the complete 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
design, supply of materials, fabrication and field enaction 
of the conveyor system as indicated in the prior letter of 
intent (Ex. 11-P). One of the terms of this purchase 
order was as follows: 
PERFORMANCE BOND: Vendor (Houben) 
to obtain Performance Bond in the amout of 
$300,000 and to furnish Purchaser 3 copies of 
bond without delay. Cost of bond for Owner's 
account, $3,000.00 (Ex. 11-P, p. 5). 
This team obligated Houben to secure and purchase a 
performance bond in the amount of $300,000, but the 
cost of the bond of $3,000 was to be borne by GSL (Tr. 
216). Houben never procured the performance bond as 
required by the purchase order (Tr. 22). 
Under the purchase order, as amended, Houben had 
the right to send GSL monthly progress billings (Tr. 216). 
Inasmuch as the cost of the bond was to be paid for by 
GSL, Houben had the right to bill GSL for the bond once 
it was obtained (Tr. 216). Shortly after November 4, 
1969, Brinkman received Houben's first monthly progress 
billing for $27,000 (Ex. 42-D). This first monthly pro-
gress billing was only for design and engineering labor 
(Ex. 41-D). It did not include the cost of the bond (Tr. 
216-18). None of the subsequent monthly progress billings 
of Houben, which GSL received, contained any charge or 
bill for the cost of the bond (Tr. 216-17, Exs. 42-D, 43-D, 
44-D, 45-D). 
Sometime prior to October, 1969, on three construc-
tion projects in San Francisco and Los Angeles, the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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United Bonding Company had executed three performance 
bonds on behalf of Houben (Tr. 156). These construction 
projects were for the City of San Francisco and the Pdrt 
of Los Angeles (Tr. 157). Prior to October 17, 1969, 
Houben had failed to pay certain of its subrontractoirs 
on these projects and they had filed "stop notices" 
with the City of San Francisco and the Port of Los 
Angeles so that funds due Houben would be paid 
directly to the subcontractors (Tr. 157). The United 
Bonding Company investigated this matter and de-
temuned that based on the estimated cost of com-
pletion and the funds to be paid to Houben from the pro-
jects, that there would be a loss in the approximate 
amount of $125,000 (Tr. 158, Ex. 39-D). The United 
Bonding Company set up a reserve of $125,000 and de-
manded that Houben and its principals, pursuant to an 
indemnity agreement, produce funds to cover the esti-
mated loss of $125,000 (Tr. 158-59). This demand was 
ignored, and Parker, on behalf of the United Bonding 
Company, on November 12, 1969, filed suit on the in-
demnity agreement against Houben and its principals and 
attached their bank accounts and other properties (Tr. 
159, Ex. 31-D). 
On November 13, 1969, Parker met with Houben 
and its attorneys, at which time Houben agreed to assign 
the proceeds from four other jobs to United Bonding to 
cover the projected $125,000 loss (Tr. 160-61, Ex. 34-D). 
Houben gave Parker the name, address and phone number 
of the corporation and the person to be contacted con-
cerning the assignments (Tr. 161, Ex. 34-D). This list 
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included: "Great Salt Lake Minerals, P. 0. Box 1190, 
Ogden, Utah 801-399-5681, Mr. Wolfgang Brinkmann, 
$27,492.30" (Ex. 34-D). 
On November 14, 1969, Parker called GSL and asked 
for Brinkmann. He spoke to someone with a German 
accent; he believes it was Brinkmann (Tr. 162, 171). 
Parker identified himself as the attorney for United Bond-
ing. He stated his purpose was to determine whether on 
assignment would be honored by GSL, the amount of 
the receivable and the date due from GSL to Houben (Tr. 
162). 
Brinkmann asked Derricott to determine whether an 
assignment could be made under the terms of the Houben 
purchase order (Tr. 129). Derricott, on the same day, 
within an hour or two, reviewed the Houben purchase 
order and advised Brinkmann that under the terms of the 
purchase order,.an assignment could not be made without 
the prior written approval of McKee (Tr. 129). 
On November 14, 1969, the same day as Ptak&r's 
phone call to GSL, Parker was telephoned by GSL, ap-
parently by Brinkmann, and was advised that GSL would 
not assign the contract proceeds (Tr. 163, 171, Ex. 20-D). 
Parker advised Houben that GSL would not honor 
the written assignment. As an alternative Houben agreed 
to request GSL to send the contract proceeds to Parker's 
law office and that upon the receipt of the chesck, Houben 
would then endorse the proceeds over to United Bonding 
(Tr. 163-64). 
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On November 17, 1969, Hoben by letter requested 
Brinkrnann, of GSL, to send the payment covering the 
first monthly progress billing of $27,000 to the law firm 
of Hermann, Button and Parker (Ex. 29-D, 35-D). Brink-
rnann sent Houben's request to Gordon Christensen, 
GSL's secretary and treasurer (Ex. 40-D). Christensen 
and Brinkrnann discussed whether or not the check should 
be sent to the law firm (Tr. 204-6, 221-22). Christensen 
advised Brinkrnann that such a request might indicate 
that Houben was in financial difficulty (Tr. 207). Brink-
rnann and Christensen made no further inquiry nor did 
they advise or consult with anyone from McKee concern-
ing Parker's original request for approval of an assign-
ment or Houben's request to send the proceeds to the 
law firm (Tr. 208, 223). On December 1, 1969, GSL 
issued and mailed its check in the amount of $27,000 to 
Houben Industries, c/o Hermann, Button and Parker 
(Ex. 36-D). 
On November 18, 1969, four days after the conversa-
tion with Parker, Brinkrnann sent an interoffice letter-
gram to Derricott requesting: "Would you please in-
itiate that we ask Houben for bonding their design, their 
manufacturing, including subcontractors for structural 
steel, and their erection . . ." (Ex. 22-D). Derricott sent 
Brinkmann's lettergram of November 18,1969 (Ex. 22-D) 
to Kenneth Ferguson (Tr. 120, 227). On November 20, 
1969, Ferguson contacted Houben about the bond and 
was advised by Niepelt of Houben that the matter was 
in hand and that the bond would be forthcoming shortly 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(Tr. 177, R. 21). Thereafter, Ferguson believes he re-
ported this information back to Derricott (Tr. 178). 
GSL allowed Houben to continue with the project 
and paid Houben's monthly progress billings. GSL paid 
Houben a total of $163,299.20 (Exs. 42-D, 43-D, 44-D and 
45-D). 
In December, 1969, the engineering and design phase 
of the project was almost complete and GSL was mov-
ing into the construction phase. GSL, on December 19, 
1969, terminated, effective January 2, 1970, the remaining 
engineering services which McKee was then performing 
(Ex. 13-P). 
On May 13, 1970, Houben, by letter, advised GSL 
that "due to the financial conditions of Houben" it could 
not complete the conveyor system (Ex. 14-P). There-
after GSL secured the services of Jelco Construction Com-
pany to finish the conveyor system (Tr. 23, 24). The 
conveyor project was completed by Jelco at a cost in 
excess of the agreed purchase price with Houben (Tr. 24). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUP-
PORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The basic issue raised by this appeal is whether or 
not the findings of fact entecred by the trial judge are 
supported by the evidence. The standard of review of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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findings of fact has been frequently restated by this 
court. 
In the case of Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Co., 
282 P. 2d 335, 3 Utah 2d 247 (1955), this court at page 
250 stated: 
When the Court has made findings and entered 
judgment thereon as was done here, it is then 
our duty to review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the findings, and they must be al-
lowed to sitand if reasonable minds could agree 
with them. Likewise, every reasonable intend-
ment ought to be indulged in favor of the valid-
ity and correctness of the judgment under review 
and it will not be disturbed unless the appellant 
meets his burden of affirmatively showing error. 
In the case of Rummell v. Bailey, 320 P. 2d 653, 7 
Utah 2d 137 (1958), this court stated at page 144: 
The rule of review of issues of fact is that all of 
the evidence and every inference and intendment 
fairly arising therefrom should be taken in the 
light most favorable to the finding made by the 
trial court. And if when so viewed there is a sub-
stantial support in the evidence for the finding 
made, it will not be disturbed. 
Although the plaintiff, in its brief, states that it 
assumes "the burden of showing error in respect to ma-
terial questions of fact in that (1) the facts as found are 
without sufficient evidentiary support in the record," (Ap-
pellant's Brief, page 36) the plaintiff does not apply 
this standard to the evidence introduced at the trial. The 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
plaintiff merely re-argues to this court the same evidence 
which it contended at the trial supported its contentions. 
The plaintiff in its brief simply ignores most of the evi-
dence which supports the findings of fact and makes no 
mention or reference to the reasonable inferences which 
can be drawn from the direct evidence which also support 
the findings of fact. 
The findings of fact which are challenged in the 
plaintiff's brief and the evidence in support of said find-
ings will be individually discussed hereafter. 
A. THERE WAS S U B S T A N T I A L EVI-
DENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF 
FACT NO. 6. 
Finding of Fact No. 6 states: 
6. On August 20,1969, GSL took over and there-
after assumed the expediting functions of the 
project, including the expediting of the Houben 
letter of intent and the contemplated Houben 
purchase order. The expediting duties assumed 
by GSL as of August 20, 1969, including any 
duty or obligation to inquire of Houben as to 
the status of the performance bond, to see that 
the bond was procured, to inquire of Houben or 
others as to Houben's ability to provide said per-
formance bond, or to advise GSL of these mat-
ters (R. 89). 
The evidence indicates that on August 20, 1969, a 
meeting was held between Brinkmann and Derricott of 
GSL, and Milhan and Ferguson of McKee relative to 
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the expediting for the project. The minutes of that meet-
ing state in part: 
F. Derricott will perform the expediting, which 
is indicated in the minutes of weekly meetings 
and as supplemented by other communications 
from McKee Engineering. Minutes of McKee 
meeting of August 8 will be used to facilitate 
immediate expediting activity. 
McKee Material Control documents and Pur-
chase order supplements are additional sources 
for deterinination of status of information re-
quired. 
McKee will arrange that F. Derricott receives 
Material Control documents pertinent to the ex-
pediting function, GSL already has complete 
purchase order records (Ex. 23-D). 
On August 21,1969, the day after it was decided that 
Derricott was to do the expediting for the project, the 
Houben letter of intent for the construction of the con 
veyor system was issued (Ex. 9-P). About one month 
later, on September 18, 1969, the Houben purchase order 
was issued (Ex. 11-P). 
In Brinkmann's Monthly Engineering Report to An-
drews, president of GSL, for the month of September, 
1969, the following statement was made: 
The expediting is now being done completely 
under GSL responsibility and has improved, so 
that detail design on certified vendor drawings 
could continue with more effort (Ex. 19-D). 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Andrews, president of GSL, testified that Brinkmann 
had authority to make agreements with McKee relative 
to the expediting functions on the project and that ac-
cording to Brinkmann's Monthly Engineering Report 
for September, 1969 (Ex. 19-D), GSL had assumed the 
responsibility for the expediting functions (Tr. 36-38). 
Andrews testified further that an expediter is "to follow 
up and make sure there are no slips on the vendor's side 
and obtaining whatever it is we are looking for within 
a scheduled period" and that an expediter uses the pur-
chase order as a guide for what a vendor should produce 
(Tr. 29). 
Derricott, the purchasing agent of GSL and the per-
son designated as the expediter, admitted that "the func-
tion of an expediter is to review the Purchase Order and 
find out what documents are required from the vendor, 
and to follow up and make sure that these documents 
are submitted by the vendor" (Tr. 116-17). Derricott 
admitted that he understood that the Houben purchase 
order required Houben to provide a performance bond 
(Tr. 116-17). 
Ferguson, the purchasing agent of McKee, testified 
that it was his understanding that "there would be no 
[McKee] expediter on the project, that Great Salt Lake 
Minerals was sending its own purchasing agent in, and 
he would serve in that function" and that an expediter 
"follows through on all of the requirements of the Pur-
chase Oder" (Tr. 174). 
The plaintiff, GSL, admits that on August 20, 1969, 
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Dwiioott assumed certain expediting duties, but at trial 
and now on appeal, it argues that "the expediting duties 
assumed by Derrioott did not include expediting the re-
ceipt of the performance bond from Houben, although 
it was expressly required by the HOUIXT purchase order. 
i\mii\ir\ to tiie uonteiiuons ni thi plaintiff at trial, 
the trial co in found that GSL on August 20, 1969, prior 
to the Houoen letter of intent and purchase order, as-
sinned the expediting functions on the project, which in-
cluded expediting the performance hwnd. Thi,-. Ending 
i$ clearly supporvd b\ -ubsi.;uili^l m-ii.!«*nct ^ -H *'»"'th 
above. 
B, TTIERE WAS S U B S T A N T I A L EVI-
DENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF 
FACT NO « 
Finding of Fact No. 8 states: 
8. From and at all times after August 21, 1969, 
the date of the issuance of the letter of intent 
to Houben, GSL, through its authorized agents, 
Fay Derricott and Wolfgang Brinkmann, knew 
that Houben had not obtained the performance 
bond, but notwithstanding this knowledge, GSL, 
by said authorized agents, allowed Houben to 
continue its work on the conveyor project un-
der the terms of the purchase order and approved 
and paid Houben's monthly progress billings (R. 
90). 
Qrinkmann testified that the Houben .letter of intent did 
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not require a bond, but only requested information about 
a possible bond and that Houben started engineering and 
design work on the basis of the letter of intent and prior 
to the actual issuance of the purchase order (Tr. 215-15). 
Brmkmann understood that Houben would bill GSL $3,-
000.00 for the cost of the bond and it had the right to 
send GSL monthly progress billings (Tr. 215-15). Brink-
mann admitted that GSL never received a bill from 
Houben for the performance bond (Tr. 215-15). 
When the first monthly progress billing was received, 
Brinkmann requested from Houben back-up data to sub-
stantiate the billing. Houben supplied Brinkmann with 
a breakdown of the charges covered by the first monthly 
progress billing (Ex. 41-D). Brinkmann testified that 
he had examined the breakdown of charges and knew 
that it was only for design and engineering labor (Tr. 
218). 
The second, third and fourth monthly progress bill-
ings which GSL received contained no charge by Houben 
for the performance bond (Exs. 43-D, 44-D and 45-D). 
GSL paid Houben on the four monthly progress billings 
the total sum of U&28Q-20.1 
On November 14,1969, Lawrence Parker^ an attorney 
for United Bonding Company, which had bonded Houben 
on other construction projects in California, called Brink-
1In answers to interrogatories, GSL admitted that before it paid the 
fourth monthly progress billing of $105,565.37 on April 20, 1970, it had 
been specifically advised by Houben that there was no performance 
bond. (R. 56-57) 
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maun, and .requested that GSL honor an assignment of 
the first monthly progress payment (T>- K£M>3> After 
GSL refused to honor a written assignment, Houben re-
quested GSL by letter to send the payment for the first 
monthly progress billing to Parker's law firm F!xs ?9~D 
35-D). 
Bnmtniunn rii^'d^ou w ill; uonwi* v,iiribtensen, 
GSL's secretary and treasurer, whether or not GSL should 
comply will Houben V request (Tr. 204-6) ("hristensen 
advised Brmkinaiin thai Houben's request might indicate 
that it was having financial problems: 
Q . W h a : i jui. ^ J . . * . ^ ,j> . *;, ui'hK'r.M,,,, , -
whether or not this letti.-i -mi u \om J N US-
sions with Mr. Brinkmann, whether or not it was 
also discussed that Houben might be having fi-
nancial problems because of the request to send 
monies to a law firm? 
A Y<» .<fi> 
Ijerricott testified tliat he had nevei u-a-i»tw a mjn 
of the performance bond and had never been advised by 
.vwrtie that a bund had been provided by Houben (Tr. 
119- ' • -.- -11 testified further: 
Q ^ y yfLTf jfekm) Would you -turn over to 
page 133. This is in response to a question asked 
by Mr. Spencer starting at Line 2: 
Q. Mr, DeiTicott, you have been asked for 
opinions or conclusions regarding the fact 
•that- no copies of the bond were .given to 
GSL, is that correct? 
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A. Yes (Tr. 126). 
Q. (by Mr. Baker) Line 7, Mr. Derricott, w£re -
these questions asked and did you give these
 M 
answers? 
Q. Do you conclude from the fact no copy 
of the bond had been given to GSL, that 
Houben had in fact not obtained a bond? 
A. I have to conclude that. 
The foregoing testimony is direct and substantial 
evidence that GSL, through its agents Brinkmann and 
Derricott, knew from and at all times after August 21, 
1969, that Houben had not procured the performance 
bond. Finding of Fact No. 8 is supported by substantial 
evidence. 
C. THERE WAS S U B S T A N T I A L EVI-
DENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF 
FACT NO. 9. 
Finding of Fact No. 9 states: 
9. Chi November 14, 1969, GSL knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, 
that Houben was in serious financial difficulty 
and probably would not have been able at that 
time to secure the required performance bond, 
but notwithstanding this knowledge, GSL allowed 
Houben to continue its work under the purchase 
order on the conveyor project under the terms 
of the purchase order and approved and paid 
Houben's monthly progress ballings (R, 90). 
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All of 'the evidence which has been previously set 
forth relative to the phone communications between 
Parker, the attorney for United Bonding Company and 
Brinkmann, of GSL, relative to the requested approval 
of an, assignment of funds to the United Bonding' Com-
pany; the request .'and transmittal of the •check by GSL 
to the law firm of Hermann, Button and Parker; and the 
fact that Gordon Christensen, secretary and treasurer of 
GSL, specifically advised IMnkmann that Houbeo/'s re-
quest that the funds be sent to the law firm might indi-
cate that Houben was in financial, difficulty, all support 
Finding of Fact No, 9. 
Park*1? aix> iu.-tiiKd UIXJUI cer •* and law-
suits which had been filed a"-;" f ' fall of 
1969, The case of tlatsti\ luring 
v. Houben hn^ it UL, w^ iiU^i on September 15, 11)89 
(Ex, 37-1 M The case of Techni-fiurfd* * ,, in, \. ( ny of 
Los Angeles, United Bonding Insurance Company, Hou-
ben, et al, was filed November 12, 1969 (Ex. 38-D). Mr. 
Parker also testified that after he became aware of the 
stop notices on the Los Angeles and San Francisco pro-
jects, that he had a meeting on October 17, 1969 with 
Houben, concerning an arrangement to cover the projected 
losses (Tr, 157-58). Parker inither testified that Houben 
could not have obtained a performance bond after No-
vember 1 1 969 (Tr. 1 68-69). . 
Mr. Andrews testifictli 
Q. ii Mi. IAJKL • ,K» ., :• <. - -'ler 
14th [and.; you were _ . \ J —^ ;*VUJJWI rveu to 
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get a performance bond, and advised you that he 
represented the United Bonding Company and 
requested the first progress hilling be paid to 
him, this conversation and claim of the United 
Bonding Company against Houben, would you 
have made an inquiry at that time? 
A. If you put it in those terms. 
MR. SPENCER: May the record show that 
was not the question presented to Mr. Brink-
mann? 
A. In those terms definitely (Tr. 244). 
Even after Brinkmann had been advised by Christen-
sen, GSL's secretary and treasurer, that Houben might 
be in financial difficulty, he made no further inquiry in-
to the matter (Tr. 208, 223, 228). GSL is charged with 
the inforrrmikm and knowledge which such an inquiry 
by a reasonable person would have disclosed. 
In Universal C. L T. Corporation v. Courtesy Motors, 
8 Utah 2d 275, 333 P. 2d 628 (1959), this court stated 
ait page 278: 
Whatever is notice enough to excite attention 
and put the party on his guard and call for in-
quiry is notice of everything to which such in-
quiry might have led. When a person has suffi-
cient information to lead him to a fact, he shall 
be deemed conversant of it. 
In Salt Lake, Garfield & W. Ry. Co. v. Allied Mater-
ials Co., 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P. 2d 883 (1955), this court 
stated at page 222: 
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Means of knowledge and knowledge itself are, in 
legal effect, the same thing where there is enough 
to put a party on inquiry. Knowledge which one 
has or ought to have under the circurostances is 
imputed to him. 
In olhor wuid&, whatever fairly puts a person on 
inquiry is sufficient notice where the means of 
knowledge are at hand; and if he omiits to in-
quire, he is then chargeable with all the facts 
which, by a proper inquiry, he might have ascer-
tained.. A person has no right to shut his eyes 
or his ears to avoid information, and then say 
that he has no notice; he does wrong not to heed 
the "signs and signals" seen by him. It will not 
do to remain willfully ignorant of a thing readily 
ascertainable . , . 
Finding of Fact No. 9 that "on November 1 4, 1969, 
GSL knew" or in the exercise of reasonable care' should 
have known that Houben was in •serious financial diffi-
culty and pirobably would not have been able at that 
time to secure a performance bond" is clearly supported 
by .the •evidence, 
• D. • T H E R E W A S SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE TO SUPPORT F1N01NC OF 
FACT NO. 1 1 , 
Finding of Fact No, 1 1 states: 
11. On November 6 and 20, 1970, McKee con-
tacted Houben and was advised by Houben that 
it was working on procuring the bond. Shortly 
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after the receipt of this information, McKee re-
ported said information to GSL (R. 90). 
Ferguson testified that he had two conversations with 
Niepelt of Houben in which he reminded Niepelt that 
the bond had not been received. Niepelt told Ferguson 
"that the matter was in hand and that we would be hav-
ing the bond shortly" (Tr. 177). Ferguson testified fur-
ther: 
* * » 
0. Did you report the subject of those conver-
sations that you had with Mr. Niepelt to anyone 
at GSL? 
A. There are no contacts to that effect, but I 
probably did. It would have been likely that I 
would have. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Demcott on a daily basis? 
A. I would say generally yes. There may have 
been some days we didn't see each other. We 
didn't have regularly scheduled meetings, or any-
thing like that. 
Q. And your report to GSL probably would 
have been to whom? 
A. It would have been to Mr. Demcott, verbally 
(Tr. 177-78). 
The plaintiff, in its brief, complains that Ferguson's 
testimony was only to the effect that he probably re-
ported the foregoing conversations to Derricott of GSL. 
Derricott at this time had an office in the McKee office 
building in San Francisco, (Tr. 55) and as Ferguson testi-
field, they generally saw one another on a daily basis. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The testimony relative u> the close and daily contact 
between these individuals at this time and Ferguson's 
testimony that he believes that he reported the conver-
sations in question to GSL is sufficient evidence to sup-
port the court's.. Finding of Fact No, 1 1 
. E. T H E R E W A S SUBSTANTIAL EVL " 
DENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF 
FACT NO. 12. 
Finding of Fact No. 12 states; 
. 12. Under the terms of the Houben purchase or-
der, Houben was prohibited from assigning mon-
ies due under the purchase order without first 
securing the written consent of McKee. On No-
vember 14, 1969, Larry Parker, an attorney rep-
resenting the United Bonding Company, advised 
Wolfgang Biinkmann, GSL's project manager, 
that he represented the United Bonding Com-
pany which had a written assignment from Hou-
ben covering funds due Houben from GSL. Par-
ker requested that GSL agree to the terms of the 
written assignment. GSL declined to do so, but 
subsequently, without advising or consulting 
McKee, GSL agreed and did, in fact, send the 
first monthly progress payment of $27,000 to 
Larry Parker, the attorney for the United Bond-
ing Company. These funds were used to pay 
claimants of Houben construction jobs in San 
Francisco and Los Angeles, California, which 
were bonded by the United Bonding Company" 
(R. 90-91), 
Paragraph 24 of the Houben purchase order required 
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the written consent of McKee before monies under the 
purchase older could be assigned by Houben (Ex. 11-P). 
The testimony in evidence which is referred to on pages 
14 and 15 of this brief, also supports Finding of Fact No. 
12. Specifically, with respect to the assignment, Parker 
testified that on November 13,1969, he met with Houben. 
Houben agreed to assign proceeds from certain jobs, in-
cluding the GSL project (Tr. 160-61). In accordance 
with that agreement, Parker, on November 14,1969, called 
Brinkmann "to find out whether or not an assignment 
to United Bonding would be honored," and was advised 
that it would not (Tr. 162). The written assignment 
was not sent to GSL because it would not accept the 
assignment (Tr. 171). Subsequently, without advising 
or consulting with McKee, GSL sent the first monthly 
progress payment to the attorneys for United Bonding 
Company (Tr. 208, 223, Ex. 36-D). There was substan-
tial evidence in the record to support Finding of Fbct 
No. 12. 
F. T H E R E W A S SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF 
FACT NO. 13. 
Finding of Fact No. 13 states: 
On December 19, 1969, GSL, effective January 
2, 1970, terminated the remaining engineering 
and procurement services which McKee was then 
performing. From January 2, 1970, until early 
March, 1970* when Houben was about to begin 
the erection of the conveyor system, GSL made 
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no inquiry of Houben concerning the performance 
bond (R. 91). 
The plaintiff only complains about the first sentence 
of the foregoing Finding of Fact No. 13. 
Mr. Andrews testified that irrespective of the expe-
diting duties that GSL was contending that McKee had 
prior to January 2, 1970, that after this date, all of the 
purchasing and expediting functions were assumed by 
GSL (Tr. 33). On December 29, 1969, Ferguson wrote 
Houben a letter which stated that "effective January 20, 
1970, responsibility for the above project will be assumed 
by Great Salt Lake Minerals'' (Ex. 13-P). 
The foregoing evidence supports the first part of 
Finding of Fact No. 13 to which the plaintiff complains. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO FIND THE FACTS AS REQUESTED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF, GSL. 
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT COMPEL 
THE ENTRY OF PLAINTIFF'S RE-
QUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The standard to be applied where a trial judge does 
not make requested findings of fact in favor of a party 
was stated by this court in the case of DeVas v. Noble, 
13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P. 2d 290 (1962), at page 137: 
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In addressing the question whether the trial 
judge was obliged to make the finding demanded 
by the defendants,, it is well to keep in mind cer-
tain principles applicable where it is required 
that a fact be found affirmatively and the court 
refuses to do so. In order to compel such a find-
ing, it is necessary that the evidence concerning 
the fact in question not only be of sufficient qual-
ity and substance to support a finding that it is 
true, but it must go beyond that and be such 
that all reasonable minds would so conclude. On 
the other hand, if there is any reasonable basis 
in the evidence, or lack of evidence, from which 
reasonable minds could honestly say they were 
not convinced of such facts by preponderance of 
the evidence, then the ruling of the trial court 
should be sustained. (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court was not persuaded that the plaintiff's 
evidence proved the facts as set forth in plaintiff's re-
quested findings of fact. There is no requested finding 
of fact where the evidence is so conclusive that "all rea-
sonable minds would so conclude." 
Plaintiff's requested findings of facts set forth in 
Points III. A., B. and G., pages 36-37 and 40 of its brief, 
relate to plaintiff's contention that McKee was obligated 
to see that the performance bond was secured by Houben, 
or that GSL was notified of the fact that Houben had 
not procured the bond. These requested findings of fact 
are merely the negative of Finding of Fact No. 6, wherein 
the trial court found that GSL had assumed and taken 
over these responsibilities. The defendant, in Point I, A.? 
page 10 of this brief, has discussed the substantial evi-
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dence in support of Findings of Fact No. 6 which cer-
tainly indicates that all reasonable men would not con-
clude that the facts were as requested by the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's requested finding of fact (Point III., L, 
plaintiff's brief, page 41) that "McKee did not tell GSL 
that the bond was delayed and did not seek instructions 
of GSL when McKee learned of Houben's delay" is also 
the negative of Finding of Fact No. 11 that shortly after 
November 20, McKee advised GSL that Houben was 
working on the bond. The evidence in support of Finding 
of Fact No. 11 is set forth in Point I. D. at pages 19-20 
herein. 
Plaintiff also complains of the trial court's failure to 
make the following findings of fact: 
That had McKee acted promptly with respect 
to the bonding of Houben, a bond would have 
been issued and a surety company would have 
been obligated to GSL, to the extent of $300,000, 
for the completion of the conveyor system. 
(Point III. D., plaintiff's brief, page 39.) 
That McKee waited seven weeks after the pur-
chase order to Houben was issued, at which time 
Houben no longer could obtain a bond to con-
tact Houben the first time about the bond, and 
McKee waited another two weeks to telephone 
Houben a second time and then waited without 
taking further action with respect to the bond-
ing of Houben. (Point III. E., plaintiff's brief, 
page 40.) 
Both of the foregoing requested findings of fact are 
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based on plaintiff's contention that shortly after Sep-
tember 18, 1969, when the Houben purchase order was 
issued, that Houben could, in fact, have secured the $300,-
000 performance bond. There is no evidence in the rec-
ord which would indicate that during this period Houben 
could have secured a performance bond. In fact, the evi-
dence on this issue is all to the contrary. The plaintiff 
evidently assumes that since Parker testified that in his 
opinion Houben could not have procured a bond after 
November 1, 1969, (Tr. 162-63) that it necessarily follows 
that Houben could have secured a bond prior to that 
time. Parker expressed no such opinion. 
Parker testified that the case of Halsey Machine and 
Manufacturing Co. v. Houben Industries, et al., was filed 
on September 15, 1969 (Tr. 166, Ex. 37-D). Parker met 
with Houben on October 17, 1969, roncerning the stop 
notices which had been filed on the construction projects 
in Los Angeles and San Francisco (Tr. 157-58). It is ob-
vious that the stop notices were filed sometime prior to 
the October 17,1969 meeting, and it is reasonable to infer 
that the stop notices would not have been filed unless 
Houben's obligations to the subcontractors had not been 
overdue for at least a period of some weeks. The fact 
that Houben did not procure any performance bond short-
ly after September 18, 1969 when the purchase order was 
issued, is evidence in and of itself that it was unable to 
secure the performance bond. All of the evidence would 
indicate that by September or October, 1969, Houben 
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was in serious financial difficulty and would not have 
been able to procure the bond. 
The plaintiff finally contends that the court erred in 
failing "to find that no benefit would have accrued to 
GSL from refusing to pay Houben after November, 1969, 
or in removing Houben from the job." (Part III. L., plain-
tiff's brief, page 42.) Under the terms of the purchase 
order, Houben, for its failure to provide the performance 
bond, could have been terminated and all of the amounts 
due it could have been retained by GSL (Ex. 11-P, para. 
20). The court in Finding of Fact No. 7 found this to be 
the fact and the plaintiff has not challenged this finding 
(R. 89). McNeil testified that had Houben been termin-
ated, two other companies who had made bids originally, 
Coastal Plains or Conveyor Engineering, could have been 
substituted for Houben and could have completed the 
job (Tr. 250). 
There was no evidence in the record which, under 
the standard as set forth in the Devas v. Noble case as 
quoted, pages 23-24, supra, would compel the entry 
of the findings of fact as requested by the plaintiff. 
B. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIIL-
ING TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AS 
REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE 
BY THE COURT ARE DEPOSITIVE OF 
THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE. 
In the case of Grey v. Defa, 107 Utah 272, 153 P. 2d 
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544 (1945), the defendants on appeal contended that the 
trial court had erred in failing to make findings of fact 
on defendants' counterclaims. The defendants, in their 
counterclaims, alleged that the plaintiff had breached 
certain contracts and leases. The court, at page 277, 
stated: 
In each instance the court found that through 
failure of the individual defendants to comply 
with the terms of the various agreements, they 
had by the very terms of said agreements, been 
terminated, and defendants had lost all rights 
thereunder. * * * The agreements had term-
inated, and plaintiff could not thereafter breach 
them. The findings made dispose of the issues, 
and it was not error for the court to fail to make 
a specific finding negativing every allegation of 
breach in each of the defendants' counterclaims. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the case of Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah 363, 145 
P. 2d 780 (1944), the court stated at page 368: 
Where issues upon which findings are made are 
necessarily decisive of the case, it is unnecessary 
that the findings should dispose of any further 
issues, as all other issues thereby become imma-
terial. 
The trial court, by virtue of Finding of Fact No. 6, 
found that prior to the time of the Houben letter of in-
tent and Houben purchase order, that GSL had assumed 
the expediting functions of the project which included 
the duty or obligation to inquire as to the status of the 
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bond, to see that the bond was procured or to inquire 
of Houben as to their ability to provide the bond (R. 89). 
The court also found in Finding of Fact No. 8 that sub-
sequent to August 21, 1969, the date of the Houben 
letter of intent, that GSL knew that Houben had not 
obtained the performance bond, and that notwithstanding 
this knowledge, it continued to allow Houben to work 
on the conveyor project and to pay monthly progress 
billings (R. 90). 
The foregoing findings of fact are decisive of the 
issues in this case. Finding of Fact No. 6 is decisive in 
that McKee had no duty, obligation or responsibility rela-
tive to see that Houben procured the performance bond. 
Finding of Fact No. 8 is decisive in that GSL had in its 
possession the very knowledge and information which it 
contends McKee had a duty to make available to it. 
Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to refuse 
to enter the findings of fact as requested by the plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ENTERED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT WERE CORRECT. 
In order for the plaintiff, GSL, to have recovered a 
judgment against the defendant, McKee, in this action, 
it would have had to establish at trial (1) a duty or ob-
ligation on the part of McKee relative to the Houben 
performance bond; (2) a breach by McKee of that duty 
or obligation; and (3) that it sustained damages as a 
proximate result of that breach. The failure of the plain-
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tiff to establish any one of the foregoing elements would, 
of course, be fatal to its case and would support the judg-
ment of no cause of action which the court, in fact, en-
tered in this case. The trial court, on all three of the 
foregoing issues, entered conclusions of law in flavor of 
the defendant, McKee. 
These conclusions of law are as follows: 
1. The defendant, McKee, did not have a duty 
or obligation, contractual or otherwise^ to in-
quire of Houban as to the status of the perform-
ance bond, to see that the bond was procured, 
to inquire of Houben or others as to Houben's 
obligation to provide said performance bond, to 
timely advise GSL that Houben had not secured 
the performance bond, or to take any action 
upon the failure of Houben to supply the per-
formance bond. 
2. Even assuming that McKee had some duty 
or obligation relative to the Houben perform-
ance bond, McKee did not breach such duty or 
obligation. 
3. Even assuming that the defendant, McKee, 
breached any such duty or obligation, such breach 
was not the proximate cause of any damage sus-
tained by the plaintiff, GSL, inasmuch as GSL 
knew at all times that Houben had not procured 
the performance bond (R. 91). 
The plaintiff, GSL does not attack the foregoing con-
clusions of law, except as it argues that the underlying 
findings of fact are not based on sufficient evidence. As 
has been pointed out herein, the findings of feet entered 
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by the court are supported by substantial evidence and 
accordingly, Conclusions of Law 1, 2 and 3 are proper 
and correct. The correctness of any one of the foregoing 
three conclusions of law is adequate to sustain the judg-
ment on appeal, as would be the correctness of any other 
conclusion of law relating to contributory negligence, 
waiver or estoppel as discussed at pages 33 et seq., infra. 
The basic rule of law in this regard has been stated 
as follows: 
Likewise, error in conclusions of law is no ground 
for reversal . . . where other conclusions justify 
the judgment . . . 
Appeal and Error, 5B C. J. S., § 1789, p. 60. 
In Lund v. Howell, 92 Utah 232, 67 P. 2d 215 (1937), 
the plaintiff brought an action to set aside, void and 
cancel certain assignments from one Ezra J. Howell to 
his wife, and subject Howell's interest to the payment 
of a prior judgment. The trial court concluded that the 
assignment was valid and also that the plaintiff's cause 
of action was barred by the Statute of Limitations and 
accordingly entered judgment for the defendant. On ap-
peal, this court stated at pages 238-39: 
Appellant contends tha the trial court erred in 
one of its conclusions of law, "The claim of plain-
tiff herein was barred by sections 6607 and 6611, 
Idaho Compiled Statutes 1919." The court does 
not find as a fact that the action is barred by lim-
itations, but does include the quotation above 
in the conclusions of law. It con make no differ-
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ence in the instant case whether the court was 
right or wrong in this conclusion, because since 
the assignments are valid the judgment must be 
affirmed regardless of the view that may be taken 
upon the question of limitations. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Co., 7 Utah 2d 293, 323 
P. 2d 712 (1958), the plaintiff brought suit alleging fraud 
by the defendants in inducing the plaintiff to enter into 
certain transactions and for breach of contract. The trial 
court found in favor of the plaintiff on both issues and 
gave judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court was in error as 
to the issue of fraud. However, the judgment was affirmed 
on the basis that the trial court's detennination of breach 
of contract was correct. The court, at page 298, stated: 
We conclude that the judgment should be af-
firmed based upon the precept that the judg-
ment should be sustained if the findings support 
it on any correct legal theory. 
In Conclusions of Law 1, 2 and 3, the trial court con-
cluded that there was no duty owed to McKee by GSL 
relative to the performance bond, no breach of any duty 
and no casual relationship to any damage which GSL 
may have sustained. Each of these conclusions of law 
are supported by the findings of fact and each indepen-
dent of the other would sustained the judgment entered 
in favor of the defendant. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION 
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OF LAW THAT GSL IS BARRED BY 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS 
CORRECT. 
Conclusion of Law No. 5 states: 
5. Any damage which the plaintiff, GSL, suf-
fered by the failure of Houben to procure the 
performance bond was the direct and proximate 
result of the plaintiff's own negligence (R. 92). 
The plaintiff argues that contributory negligence does 
not bar its recovery under its first cause of action for 
breach of contract. The only authority which the plain-
tiff cites for this proposition is a statement from Williston, 
On Contracts, § 1012 C, at pages 40-41, the pertinent part 
of which is: 
The employee is nonetheless liable though the 
principal was negligent, for the basis of liability 
is not tort but contract, and the employer is un-
der no duty to the employee to be careful about 
his own affairs. (Emphasis added.) 
An examination of the foregoing text of Williston 
indicates that the only case authority which he cites for 
the foregoing proposition are two English cases. Willis-
ton cites the case of Becker v. Medd, 13 TL Rep. 313, 
decided in 1897, and the case of Vail Brothers v. Hobsony 
149 LT Rep. 283 (KB), decided in 1933. Although the 
foregoing statement may have been the law in England 
in 1933, it has not been adopted by jurisdictions in the 
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United States. The Restatement of Agency 2d, § 415, 
states: 
Principal's Contributory Fault as Defense. The 
liability of the agent to the principal can be 
avoided, terminated, or reduced by a breach of 
contract by the principal, his contributory fault, 
or his failure to mitigate damages. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The very authority upon which the plaintiff relies to 
establish the duty of an agent who undertakes to procure 
insurance for his principal recognizes the defense of 
contributory negligence. The plaintiff, at pages 21-22 in 
its brief, from 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 175 states 
as follows: 
Where the agent fails to procure insurance in ac-
cordance with his instructions* the person em-
ploying him for that purpose is not contributory 
negligent because of not seeking to obtain in-
surance through other means where he has not 
been notified that a policy of insurance has not 
been issued. (Emphasis added.) 
Any duty or obligation on the part of McKee rela-
tive to seeing that Houben was bonded, arose by virtue 
of the principal-agent relationship between the parties. 
The plaintiff admits that this duty, if it existed, was im-
plied. The plaintiff, at page 19 of its brief, states "a 
promise on McKee's part to see to the bonding of Houben 
must be implied." 
In the case of Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Lea, 
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401 F. 2d 650 (C. A. 3rd, 1968), the court stated at page 
656 the corresponding duties of principal and agent: 
An insurance broker is under a duty to exercise 
the care that a reasonably prudent businessman 
in the brokerage field would exerdse under sim-
ilar circumstances and if the broker fails to ex-
ercise such care and if such care is the direct 
cause of loss to his customer, then he is liable 
for such loss unless the customer is also guilty 
of failure to exercise care of a reasonably pru-
dent businessman for the protection of his own 
property and business which contributes to the 
happening of such loss. (Emphasis added.) 
In the case of Adkins & Ainley, Inc. v. Busaday 270 
A. 2d 135 (D. C. Ct. of App., 1970), the court stated at 
page 137: 
It is true that in the first transaction the broker 
has a duty to inform the insured of cancella-
tion, however, he is legally relieved of that duty 
if it can be sfiown that the insured knew or 
should have known of the cancellation from other 
sources. (Emphasis added.) 
Where a person knows or reasonably should know 
that his insurance agent has not procured requested in-
surance, he has a corresponding duty not to be contribu-
torily negligent or, in other words, to use reasonable care 
to protect his property interests. 
The trial court found as a fact that GSL continually, 
from August 21, 1969, the date the letter of intent was 
issued to Houben, knew that Houben was not bonded, 
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and nevertheless it allowed Houben to continue on the 
project and continued to pay monthly progress billings. 
(Finding of Fact No. 8, R. 90). The court also found 
that GSL had the right to terminate Houben for its fail-
ure to provide the bond and to retain all monies due 
Houben. (Finding of Fact No. 7, R. 89.) This Finding 
of Fact was not challenged by the plaintiff. 
Certainly the foregoing Findings of Fact support the 
court's Conclusion of Law that "any damage which the 
plaintiff, GSL, suffered by the failure of Houben to pro-
cure the performance bond was the direct and proximate 
result of the plaintiff's own negligence" (R. 92). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION 
OF LAW THAT GSL HAD WAIVED ITS 
RIGHTS AGAINST McKEE AND WAS 
ESTOPPED TO ASSERT SUCH RIGHTS 
WAS CORRECT. 
Conclusion of Law No. 6 states: 
Any duty or obligation of the defendant, McKee, 
relative to the Houben performance bond or any 
rights arising from any breach or damage thereof 
was waived by the plaintiff, GSL, and the plain-
tiff is estopped to assent such rights or the breach 
thereof against the defendant, McKee (R. 92). 
This court has defined waiver in the case of Woolley 
v. Loose, 57 Utah 336, 194 Pac. 908 (1920), at pages 347-
48: 
Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relin-
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quisihment of a known legal right and implies an 
election to dispense with something of value or 
forego some advantage which the party waiv-
ing might, at his option, have demanded or in-
sisted upon. 
* * * 
It must be made to appear that the defendant 
waived the right either in express terms or by 
showing such facts and circumstances from which 
the intention to waive may be clearly inferred 
or implied. (Emphasis added.) 
The principle of waiver has been applied to the con-
tractual requirements of performance bonds. 
In Lesser v. William Holiday Cord Associates, Inc., 
349 F. 2d 490 (C. A. 8th, 1965), the court held at page 
493: 
The subcontract, as has been noted, provided 
that Atlas at its expense should provide the per-
formance and payment bond by September 22, 
1959. A requirement of this kind, in a construc-
tion contract may, of course, be waived. (Cita-
tions omitted.) We feel, as did the trial court, 
that by permitting Atlas to come upon the job-
site after September 22 without the submission 
of the performance and payment bond, D & L 
waived the subcontract's requirement that the 
bond be furnished. 
See also, Hevenor v. Union Railroad Co. of New York 
City, 198 N. Y. S. 409, 410 (1923). 
In plaintiff's brief, at pages 26 and 27, it argues that 
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the waiver of a contractual right requires consideration. 
In support of this contention, the plaintiff cites the Utah 
case of Schwab Safe & Lock Co. v. Snow, 47 Utah 199, 
152 Pac. 171 (1915). The defendant submits that the 
plaintiff in its brief has misinterpreted the holding of the 
Schwab case. In that case, the defendant counterclaimed 
for damages arising out of the failure of the plaintiff 
to deliver certain safes which the defendant had ordered 
from the plaintiff. With respect to the order of one W. H. 
Bishop, the court held that the defendant had waived 
his right to recover damages for the breach of this order 
because the defendant's proposal to cancel the order had 
been accepted by the plaintiff. The court stated at pages 
202 and 211: 
The defendant, however, proposed an uncondi-
tional cancellation of the order, and the plaintiff 
accepted the proposition . . . acceptance by plain-
tiff of defendant's proposal to cancel or rescind 
the order was a sufficient consideration to sup-
port such rescission or cancellation. (Emphasis 
added.) 
* * * 
But what is a "waiver"? It is defined as being 
the volutary and intentional relinquishment of 
a known legal right and implies an election to 
dispense with something of value or forego some 
advantage which the party waiving it might, at 
his option, have demanded or insisted upon. 4 
Words and Phrases (2d Ser.) 1226,1227. 
A waiver may or may not rest in contract. If it 
does, it, like all other contracts, requires some 
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consideration. It may, however, also partake of 
the nature of an estoppel in pais. 
The court held in the Schwab case that a waiver of 
a contractual right or a breach of contract may be made 
by mutual consent or contract, and if it is, then con-
sideration is necessaiy. However, the court also stated 
that waiver may also be based on the voluntary and in-
tentional relinquishment of a known legal right in the 
nature of an estoppel in pais.2 
The subsequent Utah cases which have considered 
waiver have not referred to any requirement of consider-
ation. The case of Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath, 
90 Utah 187, 61 P. 2d 308 (1936), involved the issue as 
to whether or not certain instructions by an insurance 
company to its agent to reduce the coverage on a fire 
policy had been waived. The case of American Savings 
and Loan Association v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 
P. 2d 1 (1968), involved the issue of whether or not the 
contractual right of the mortgagee to accelerate the debt 
had been waived. 
The case of Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 119 Utah 465, 229 
P. 2d 296 (1951), involved the validity of an assignment 
of certain debts. The assignment to the plaintiff was 
contingent upon the payment by the assignor to the as-
signee of $9,000. This $9,000 payment had not been 
2Estpppel in pais is "an estoppel not arising from deed or record or 
written contract . . . The doctrine is that a person may be precluded 
by his act or conduct or silence, when it is his duty to speak, from as-
serting a right he would otherwise have had." Black's Law Dictionary, 
(4th Ed.) p. 898. 
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made. On this ground, the defendant claimed that the 
assignment was invalid. The trial court concluded that 
the plaintiff had waived this requirement. This court on 
appeal stated at page 468: 
As stated in 17 C. J. S., Contracts § 491, p. 933: 
* * * a party to a contract, who is entitled 
to demand performance of a condition prece-
dent, may waive the same, either expressly or 
by acts evidencing such intention. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the foregoing Ahrendt case, there was no discus-
sion that considerajtion was necessary to sustain the 
waiver. 
The requirement of the $300,000 performanice bond 
by Houben and the requirement that it be provided with-
out delay and any obligation on the part of McKee to 
see that it was provided without delay were for the bene-
fit of GSL, These rights,, of course, could be waived by 
GSL. The court found that continuously from August 
21, 1969, the date of the Houben letter of intent, GSL 
knew that no performance bond had been provided; never-
theless, it continued to allow Houben to continue with 
the conveyor project and continued to make monthly 
progress payments. (Finding of Pact No. 8, R. 90,) The 
court also found that GSL, as the principal and owner, 
had the right at all times to terminate Houben because 
of the failure to provide the performance bond, and upon 
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such termination could have retained all payments which 
were due to Houben. (Finding of Pact No. 7, R. 89.) 
The court entered its conclusion of law that GSL had 
waived any rights which it had against McKee relative 
to seeing that the performance bond was provided. This 
conclusion of law is clearly supported by the findings of 
fact and is correct under the foregoing legal authority. 
The court also concluded that GSL was estopped to 
assert any claim against McKee arising out of Houben's 
failure to procure the performance bond. In the case of 
Cook v. Cook, et al., 110 Utah 406,174 P.2d 434 (1946), 
the court at page 411 defined estoppel: 
To constitute an estoppel there must be conduct 
amounting to a misrepresentation or conceal-
ment of material facts; these facts must be known 
to the party sought to be estopped and unknown 
at the party who claims the benefit of the 
estoppel and who relying upon such conduct 
acted upon it to his loss. 
The doctrine of estoppel by silence was recognized 
by this court in the case of Utah State Building Commis-
sion v. Great American Indemnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 140 
P.2d 763 (1943). The Utah Supreme Court stated at 
pages 29-30: 
It is almost unnecessary to add that mere inaction 
or silence may, under peculiar circumstances, 
amount to both misrepresentation and conceal-
ment which may amount to an estoppel... 
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It is generally held that in order for silence to 
work an estoppel, there must be a legal duty to 
speak or there must be something willful or culp-
able in the silence which allows another to place 
himself in an unfavorable position by reason 
thereof. 
It is clear that a principal has a duty to inform his 
agent of any risks which are unknown to the agent and 
Which if unknown would subject the agent to pecuniary 
loss. See Restatement of Agency, 2d § 435. 
In Lawrence Warehouse Company v. Twohig, 224 F.2d 
493 (C.A. 8th, 1955), the court stated at page 497: 
. . . A principal has the obligation of exercising 
good faith toward his agent in the incidents of 
their relationship. He is subject to the responsi-
bility in favor of the agent of using care to pre-
vent harm coming to the agent in the prosecu-
tion of the enterprise, 'and this extends in gen-
eral to his disclosing facts which, if unknown, 
would be likely to subject the agent to pecuniary 
loss.9 (Emphasis added) 
If GSL as principal was relying on McKee to see that 
Houben secured the performance bond and would attempt 
to hold McKee responsible in the event that the bond was 
not procured, GSL had a duty to advise McKee of any 
information which came to its attention relative to Hou-
ben's ability to secure the performance bond. 
The court found that on November 14, 1969, GSL 
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
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known, that Houben was in serious financial difficulty 
and probably would not have been able at that time to 
secure the required performance bond. (R. 90) The court 
also found that GSL did not advise McKee of the infor-
mation and knowledge which GSL had concerning Hou-
ban's financial difficulties. (R. 90) The court concluded 
in Conclusion of Law No. 4, that GSL had breached its 
duty to inform McKee in this regard. (R. 92) In Finding 
of Fact No. 7, the court found that GSL had the right to 
terminate Houben for its failure to procure the perform-
ance bond and retain all monies due. (R. 89) 
GSL had a duty to advise McKee of Houben's fi-
nancial difficulties of which it knew on November 14, 
1969. The failure to do so placed McKee in the "unfavor-
able position" of potential loss by GSL's failure to inform 
McKee of Houben's financial difficulties and its failure 
to terminate Houben. The court properly concluded that 
GSL's failure in this regard estops it from asserting any 
action against McKee arising out of Houben's failure to 
provide the performance bond. 
CONCLUSION 
As indicated herein, the findings of fact are supported 
by substantial evidence. The evidence is contrary to plain-
tiff's requested findings of fact and certainly is not "such 
that all reasonable men would conclude" that its request-
ed findings are correct. The conclusions of law are support-
ed by the findings of fact and are correct under the ap-
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plicable legal authorities. The judgment entered in favor 
of the defendant, Arthur G. McKee & Company, should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MERLIN 0. BAKER 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake Sity, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
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